Image courtesy of 'The New York Times.' Children in Camden, New Jersey, waving Israeli flags after the state's creation in 1948.
"Politics" of Containment
To fully assess Clifford's overall influence, we must examine the partisan and electoral considerations at stake during the Palestine crisis; through which we can better determine whether Clifford was really an architect and advocate of containment, or is it more accurate to identify him as simply Truman's domestic political advisor and speechwriter?
Historical Context:
In short, Truman was unlikely to be reelected in the 1948 election. Earlier that year, former secretary of commerce Henry Wallace left the Democratic Party and formed the Progressive Party, as well as South Carolina governor Strom Thurmond who formed the Dixiecrat Party. With the Democrats widely divided, the Republican candidate Thomas Dewey was seen as the forecasted winner; so much so, that the Chicago Daily Tribune falsely printed the headline proclaiming Dewey as the 1948 winner rather than Truman. [1] |
Recognizing Truman's bleak political chances winning the upcoming election and Clifford's role as a domestic advisor, the State Department, led by George Marshall, attacked and criticized the recognition of Israel as a mere political ploy.
Historians such as Snetsinger and Acacia have since adopted Marshall's argument, claiming that Truman, following the advice of Clifford, recognized Israel solely to win the influential Jewish vote in the 1984 election.
Historians such as Snetsinger and Acacia have since adopted Marshall's argument, claiming that Truman, following the advice of Clifford, recognized Israel solely to win the influential Jewish vote in the 1984 election.
Acacia's 'The Wise Men of Washington'
"Truman’s chances in 1948 were considered bleak at best, and the Jewish bloc, if energized, had the potential to be a crucial swing vote in some key states. Recognition of Israel could help to cement an important segment of the Democratic base and improve Truman’s chances that fall. Clifford’s playing a major role in the policy debate over recognition signaled to Marshall that domestic politics was the primary factor in the administration’s support of Israel. As the president’s key political advisor Clifford’s motives in this debate deserve close scrutiny, but to Marshall it was an open and shut case--Clifford was demeaning the presidency and threatening U.S. national security in a naked attempt to win votes"[2]
Snetsinger's 'Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel'
Clifford "was clearly aware of the political need for a significant American commitment to Israel" and "was determined to guide the president toward an Israeli policy that would win approval within the Jewish community" [3]
In fact, Cohen, the author of Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor, insinuates that Truman superseded his reelection over American national interest and security; claiming that Truman "saw the logic in the State Department argument--that support of the Zionist cause could prove to be detrimental to the American national interest--but was driven, if not coerced, against his own judgment and feelings, by domestic political exigencies" [4]
The American Jewish Community:
After WWII, the United States "as a whole turned increasingly toward religion—a response, some believed, to wartime horrors and to the postwar threat from “godless” Communism;" the greatest example being American Judaism. As a form of spiritual resistance to Nazism and antisemitism, Judaism emerged as America’s “third faith” alongside Protestantism and Catholicism, where postwar prosperity allowed for "the greatest synagogue-building boom in all of American Jewish history." [5] In fact, by the 1930s, the American Jewish community, with more than 4 million members, became the largest in the world. [6]
Despite what one may expect, the American Jewish community was deeply divided in regard to the Palestine crisis and its potential partioning. On the one hand, assimilated German American Jews opposed the idea of a separate statehood for Jews, believing it would raise the issue of divided loyalties; "they were, they insisted, Americans of the Hebrew faith, not just Jews who happened to live in America." On the other hand, the more recent and larger group of Eastern European Jews strongly supported the Zionist cause, migrating "from former czarist lands" such as the Balkans and Austria-Hungary. [7]
On November 29th, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution 181 (II), recommending the partitioning of Palestine at the end of the British Mandate in 1948. Even though the U.S. was a strong supporter of the partition and Zionist cause, the "supporters of the establishment of a Jewish state were warned that they "must not let down now;" pressuring the president to remain firm on its Palestine position as well as mobilizing American public opinion by publishing newspaper advertisements and public rallies. [8]
In general, the American Jewish community was an important and influential electorate in the 1948 election. The Jewish population concentrated in certain states such as Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio; the most important state being New York, which with 2.5 million Jewish residents and 47 electoral votes "could decide which candidate could become president." [9] In fact, no president since 1876, excluding Wilson in 1916, had won the presidency without also winning the state of New York. [10]
After WWII, the American Jewish community also became highly affluent; while the vast majority of Jewish immigrants in the early twentieth century were poor, in the postwar era, an increase of American Jews achieved greater degrees of economic security and acquired intellectual occupations. In fact, after the war, it "was, by default, the largest and wealthiest Jewish community in the world. The Jews had prospered as never before in pluralistic and democratic America." [11] Not only were Jewish voters now seen as an important electorate, but also as an inflow of financial support for the Democratic party.
Despite what one may expect, the American Jewish community was deeply divided in regard to the Palestine crisis and its potential partioning. On the one hand, assimilated German American Jews opposed the idea of a separate statehood for Jews, believing it would raise the issue of divided loyalties; "they were, they insisted, Americans of the Hebrew faith, not just Jews who happened to live in America." On the other hand, the more recent and larger group of Eastern European Jews strongly supported the Zionist cause, migrating "from former czarist lands" such as the Balkans and Austria-Hungary. [7]
On November 29th, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution 181 (II), recommending the partitioning of Palestine at the end of the British Mandate in 1948. Even though the U.S. was a strong supporter of the partition and Zionist cause, the "supporters of the establishment of a Jewish state were warned that they "must not let down now;" pressuring the president to remain firm on its Palestine position as well as mobilizing American public opinion by publishing newspaper advertisements and public rallies. [8]
In general, the American Jewish community was an important and influential electorate in the 1948 election. The Jewish population concentrated in certain states such as Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio; the most important state being New York, which with 2.5 million Jewish residents and 47 electoral votes "could decide which candidate could become president." [9] In fact, no president since 1876, excluding Wilson in 1916, had won the presidency without also winning the state of New York. [10]
After WWII, the American Jewish community also became highly affluent; while the vast majority of Jewish immigrants in the early twentieth century were poor, in the postwar era, an increase of American Jews achieved greater degrees of economic security and acquired intellectual occupations. In fact, after the war, it "was, by default, the largest and wealthiest Jewish community in the world. The Jews had prospered as never before in pluralistic and democratic America." [11] Not only were Jewish voters now seen as an important electorate, but also as an inflow of financial support for the Democratic party.
The American Arab Community:
In comparison to the Jewish electorate, Arabs were significantly smaller and less influential in elections. In fact, Appointments Secretary Matt Connelly argued in favor of recognition to the president with two only reasons, "One, it was humanitarian, and two, it was good politics," asking the president bluntly, "How many Arab votes are there in the United States? Where does the Democratic Party get its financing from?" [12]
Marshall and the State Department:
From Marshall's perspective, winning the election superseded international considerations. In a nutshell, Truman, desperate for votes, looked to win over electorate groups; and with the eruption of Palestine and the subsequential displaced Jewish population, the American Jewish community became the perfect target. "Because of the necessity emphasized by the White House advisers of winning the fall election, the White House became in effect the foreign office of the state of Israel;" Truman willing to do anything to secure the Jewish vote. [13]
Clifford:
Naturally, Clifford found these accusations, at the time made by virtually the entire State Department, extremely offensive to both Truman and his own political values, demeaning their international and moral considerations for solely domestic advantages.
Defending Truman, Clifford argued that "he doesn't consider [the recognition of Israel] to be a question of numbers. He has always supported the right of the Jews to have their own homeland, from the moment he became President. He considers this to be a question about the moral and ethical considerations that are present in that part of the world. He is very sympathetic to their needs and desired, and I assure you he is going to continue to lend our country's support to the creation of a Jewish State." Regardless, Clifford argued that "the key to the Jewish vote in 1948 would not be the Palestine issue, but a continued commitment to liberal political and economic policies." [14]
Defending Truman, Clifford argued that "he doesn't consider [the recognition of Israel] to be a question of numbers. He has always supported the right of the Jews to have their own homeland, from the moment he became President. He considers this to be a question about the moral and ethical considerations that are present in that part of the world. He is very sympathetic to their needs and desired, and I assure you he is going to continue to lend our country's support to the creation of a Jewish State." Regardless, Clifford argued that "the key to the Jewish vote in 1948 would not be the Palestine issue, but a continued commitment to liberal political and economic policies." [14]
My Opinion:
Whether the Recognition of Israel was tainted by Truman and Clifford's political endeavors or was genuinely to protect both the Jews abroad and the American national interest, I leave for you to decide.
Personally, I am inclined to support Clifford, who, as a writer of the Clifford-Elsey report and serving during the beginning of the Cold War, was focused on addressing issues in regard to the growing threat of the Soviet Union.
Naturally, as one of Truman's domestic advisers, Clifford saw and valued the electoral advantages associated with Israel's recognition; however, I do not believe acquiring Jewish votes was his main motive, but rather the "cherry on top" or perhaps a secondary goal following the containment of the Soviet Union. Perhaps Clifford would fit within Herring's definition of a practical idealist, standing firm in the U.S.' ideals at the time of containment while also seeking to appeal to Zionist voters to help Truman win the 1948 election.
Personally, I am inclined to support Clifford, who, as a writer of the Clifford-Elsey report and serving during the beginning of the Cold War, was focused on addressing issues in regard to the growing threat of the Soviet Union.
Naturally, as one of Truman's domestic advisers, Clifford saw and valued the electoral advantages associated with Israel's recognition; however, I do not believe acquiring Jewish votes was his main motive, but rather the "cherry on top" or perhaps a secondary goal following the containment of the Soviet Union. Perhaps Clifford would fit within Herring's definition of a practical idealist, standing firm in the U.S.' ideals at the time of containment while also seeking to appeal to Zionist voters to help Truman win the 1948 election.
Perhaps puncturing the argument of Marshall, the Jewish vote proved not as important as he and his fellow State Department colleagues argued.
Truman won the 1948 election and did so without New York. Not only was Truman running against the Republican candidate Dewey, but also the third-party candidate, Henry Wallace, who "with his progressive political stance attracted many New Yorkers who would doubtless have voted for the president if limited to a choice between Truman and Dewey." [15] |
Overall, “the recognition of Israel was one of the most significant foreign policy decisions of the twentieth century and continues to have profound political and geopolitical implications to this day.” [16]
"What would have happened if President Truman had not acted as he did? History does not allow us to test alternatives, but in my view American recognition and the support that followed was vital in helping Israel survive. Emboldened by less American support for Israel, the Arabs might have been more successful in their war against the Jews. If that had happened, the U.S. might have faced a far more difficult decision within a year; either offer the Israelis American military support, or risk watching the Arabs drive the Israelis into the sea" -Clark Clifford [17]
In regard to its’ implications today, supporters of recognition have correlated it as the foundation of the strong relationship between the U.S. and Israel today. While critics often point out the overall failure of the partition to create peace; a year later, the Arab armies invaded Israel renewing the Arab-Israeli conflict. [18]
Sources:
[1] Debolt and Baugess, Encyclopedia of the Sixties: A Decade of Culture and Counterculture [2 Volumes]: A Decade of Culture and Counterculture, 137-138.
[2] Acacia, Clark Clifford: The Wise Man of Washington, 90.
[3] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 123.
[4] Michael J. Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor (Missouri: Truman State University, 2008), 127.
[5] Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004), 275.
[6] Debi Unger and Irwin Unger, George Marshall (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 418.
[7] Unger, George Marshall, 418.
[8] Sarna, American Judaism, 276.
[9] Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor, 127.
[10] Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor, 122.
[11] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 75.
[12] Michael J. Devine, Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East (Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2008), 113.
[13] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 120.
[14] Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, 23.
[15] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 133.
[16] Acacia, Clark Clifford: The Wise Man of Washington, 118.
[17] Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, 24.
[18] "U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel," National Archives, last modified on August 2, 2021, U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel | National Archives.
[1] Debolt and Baugess, Encyclopedia of the Sixties: A Decade of Culture and Counterculture [2 Volumes]: A Decade of Culture and Counterculture, 137-138.
[2] Acacia, Clark Clifford: The Wise Man of Washington, 90.
[3] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 123.
[4] Michael J. Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor (Missouri: Truman State University, 2008), 127.
[5] Jonathan D. Sarna, American Judaism (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004), 275.
[6] Debi Unger and Irwin Unger, George Marshall (New York: HarperCollins, 2014), 418.
[7] Unger, George Marshall, 418.
[8] Sarna, American Judaism, 276.
[9] Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor, 127.
[10] Cohen, Truman's Recognition of Israel: The Domestic Factor, 122.
[11] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 75.
[12] Michael J. Devine, Harry S. Truman, the State of Israel, and the Quest for Peace in the Middle East (Missouri: Truman State University Press, 2008), 113.
[13] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 120.
[14] Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, 23.
[15] Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, 133.
[16] Acacia, Clark Clifford: The Wise Man of Washington, 118.
[17] Clifford, Counsel to the President: A Memoir, 24.
[18] "U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel," National Archives, last modified on August 2, 2021, U.S. Recognition of the State of Israel | National Archives.